Stanford Cramer v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation; Consolidated Rail Corporation; and Lower Swatara Township

Background

In 1984, Lower Swatara Township erected barricades closing the Whitehouse Lane Bridge over the tracks of Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") because of concerns regarding the bridge's structural integrity. Whitehouse Lane had been a major access route to the Harrisburg Airport, but a new highway spur was constructed to provide airport access.

Stanford Cramer ("Cramer") purchased approximately 5.5 acres of property accessed by the bridge in 1988 from his mother, who had originally purchased the property in 1986. Cramer contended in several hearings before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ("PUC") that the closed bridge provided the sole access to his property and sought an order that it be reconstructed. Finally, in 1996, the PUC ordered Conrail to remove the bridge, as "a reconstructed crossing would solely benefit Cramer, and would not be in the public interest."

Following the removal of the bridge, Cramer sought damages before the PUC for a de facto taking of his property, alleging that access to his property was lost when the bridge was removed. The PUC eventually referred the matter to the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Conrail and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") filed preliminary objections to Cramer's Petition for Appointment of a Board of View to determine his damages. The Dauphin County Court denied the preliminary objections of Conrail and PennDOT, and ordered the appointment of a board of view. Both Conrail and PennDOT appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.

Solution

Benjamin Dunlap argued on behalf of Conrail that before the Court of Common Pleas could appoint a board of view, it was required to make an independent determination as to whether a de facto taking had occurred. (A de facto taking occurs when no formal declaration of taking is filed, but an entity having the power of eminent domain "substantially deprives property owners of the use and enjoyment of their property.") He further argued that Conrail could not be considered a condemner under the Eminent Domain Code, as it was not acting pursuant to its powers of eminent domain when removing the bridge, but was instead taking out an unsafe bridge pursuant to a PUC Order to do so.

Result

The Commonwealth Court agreed with Mr. Dunlap that the Court of Common Pleas had a duty to first determine whether a de facto taking had occurred, and if so, by whom, before a board of view could be appointed to determine damages. The Court also held, for the first time, that the PUC does not have jurisdiction to address de facto taking matters, and therefore, such claims, when arising in the context of PUC proceedings, must be determined by a court of common pleas pursuant to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Code. The Commonwealth Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for a hearing and determination pursuant to its decision.

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