Krentz v. Consolidated Rail Corporation
2006 WL 3371489 (Supreme Court 165 and 155 MAP 2005)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion ruled on November 21, 2006 that the occupied crossing rule is still the law of Pennsylvania despite the enactment of the comparative negligence statute and that the Commonwealth's "blocked crossing" statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6907, is preempted under the provisions of the Federal Rail Safety Act(FRSA) and is thus unenforceable in Pennsylvania. It is the first Supreme Court decision in decades to address the occupied crossing rule and the first ever to consider and rule on the issue of federal preemption of §6907. Justice Newman authored the opinion.
The case arose out of a train vehicle collision in Lancaster County where the plaintiff drove into a standing train at a crossbuck crossing while the train was performing a runaround move on a dead end spur line used to service a local industry. The plaintiff claimed the railroad was negligent for failure to warn of its presence and was negligent per se for blocking the crossing in violation of §6907. He also claimed adverse weather (fog) and darkness prevented him from seeing the train. In addition, the plaintiff claimed the tanker car he struck had high clearance, thus preventing him from seeing it, despite the fact that cars on the opposite side of the crossing had seen the train and stopped. The trial court granted summary judgment to the railroad on the failure to warn claim under the occupied crossing rule holding that once the train occupied the crossing, no further warnings were required. It later granted summary judgment on the negligence per se claim ruling that §6907 was preempted by the FRSA and thus could not form a basis for a claim of negligence against the railroad. The plaintiff appealed and the Superior Court affirmed the occupied crossing ruling but reversed on the preemption claim. Both the plaintiff and the railroad appealed their respective adverse rulings.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the occupied crossing rule was still the law of Pennsylvania and that once a train occupies a crossing, it has no further duty to warn since its mere presence is warning enough for an alert driver. Since no duty is owed by the railroad, the comparative negligence statute has no effect on the rule since there is no breach of duty by the railroad to be compared to the plaintiff's negligence. The Court also held that the claims of adverse weather, height and color(black) of the rail car, incline of the road and darkness did not equate to the crossing being "ultra hazardous," the only exception to the rule. The Court noted the exception is usually applied to the crossing itself and not the train. The Court also coupled its decision with a strong statement of the duty of motorists to stop, look and listen and to be able to stop their vehicle within the assured clear distance ahead.
As to the negligence per se claim based upon an alleged violation of §6907, the Court held that the statute was preempted by the FRSA and that, thus, no claim of negligence could be based upon it. The Court ruled that the move being done at the time of the collision could only have been done there due to the configuration of the line and that the train had to perform mandatory air brake tests before it could proceed. The only way the railroad would not have to block the crossing during this time would be to limit the length of its train or fail to do the required brake tests. This would impermissibly interfere with the national uniform regulatory purposes of the FRSA and thus the effect of the blocked crossing statute renders it in conflict and thus preempted.
Nauman Smith lawyers Craig J. Staudenmaier and Lucinda C. Glinn represented the railroad.
Nauman Smith Shissler & Hall, LLP
200 North 3rd Street, 18th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
717.236.3010
fax: 717.234.1925
info@nssh.com